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Abstract
We develop a model of bargaining and litigation in the context of patent licensing (or any
contractual setting). Following Priest and Klein (1984) we developed a model that explicitly
allows for (1) multiple parties (leading to asymmetry of stakes), (2) binding precedent, and
(3) pre-dispute bargaining done in the “shadow” of precedent-setting courts. The pre-dispute
bargaining creates an endogenous opportunity cost of litigation for both plaintiff and defendant;
i.e., the harm is endogenous. We show that the effects of asymmetric stakes on the litigation
rate and plaintiff win rate are offset by opportunity costs (forgone licensing). That is, the degree
of asymmetry does not appear to substantially impact the rate of litigation or the observed win
rate of plaintiffs at trial. This result is in stark contrast to the previous theoretical literature,
and has implications for interpreting the empirical literature.
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1 Introduction
Since the seminal work of Priest and Klein in 1984 (hereafter, PK) scholars have been aware of
the importance of selection effects in the study of litigated disputes. Their model, and subsequent
contributions by other scholars (Cooter and Rubinfeld 1989, Che and Yi 1993, Waldfogel 1995,
Daughety and Reinganum 1993), show formally that litigated disputes are pathological, and that
the set of disputes selected for litigation are not representative of the population of disputes. The
most fundamental result of PK is that the plaintiff win rate of litigated cases will be biased towards
50% relative to the population win rate. The bias toward 50% can be either upward or downward
depending on whether the population win rate is higher or lower than 50%. As the litigation rate
becomes smaller, the bias will be more acute because the selection effects become stronger.
As noted by PK, the 50% rule is not robust to all specifications–notably asymmetric stakes.
Asymmetry is an important extension in many instances, since it represents the case where either
(1) the plaintiff has more to gain than the defendant has to lose; or, (2) the defendant has more to
lose than the plaintiff has to gain. The most straightforward justification for this scenario is that
of precedent. Cited examples include products liability (PK), medical malpractice (Wittman 1988),
and tobacco trials (Che and Yi 1993). In the recent Merck Vioxx trials, a large defendant faces many
potential plaintiffs in similar suits. The outcome of the initial trial has ramifications beyond the
potential damage payment from defendant to plaintiff. In that instance, the stakes for the defendant
are much larger (in dollar value) than those of the plaintiff.
In the case of patents a patent holder bringing an infringement suit against an alleged infringer
may find its bargaining position with licensees improved as the result of an infringement verdict
(Waldfogel 1995, Lanjouw and Schankerman 2001). Further, the patent holder risks invalidation
of the patent. Obviously any such invalidation may have consequences that go beyond the current
dispute.
In contrast to the symmetric stakes finding, PK find that greater asymmetry can radically change
the results of their model. In fact, the bias in the win rate due to selection can go the opposite
direction (away from 50%; see figure 1). Waldfogel (1995) finds evidence of this in intellectual
property disputes.
The case of asymmetric stakes relates more generally to any situation where precedent is more
important to one party than to another. Che and Yi (1993) investigate precedent in a two period
model with two identical plaintiffs. They point out that a party’s decision to go to court will include
facing potential gains or losses from trial, as well as the precedent set for future cases.1 Parties will
alter their pre-trial bargaining strategies in the face of precedent.
Like Che and Yi (1993), the current paper allows for both good and bad precedent. However,
the modeling strategy follows PK very closely, in order to facilitate a comparison of the conclusions
about selection and litigation. Additionally, we allow asymmetry to be defined broadly with an
arbitrary number of heterogeneous opponents.
PK consider only the asymmetric stakes related to a plaintiff win. That is, they examine only the
“up side” to asymmetry. For instance, in PK’s model it is assumed that the value of the judgment
to a winning plaintiff is J. With asymmetric stakes, the defendant–if it loses–pays αJ, where
α ∈ (0, 1]. The plaintiff receives αJ from the defendant and (1 − α)J in the form of some value of
precedent. If the plaintiff loses, PK assume that the status quo prevails (with the status quo being
0).2 Figure 1 replicates a simulation from PK, where the horizontal axis is the level of symmetry
between plaintiff and defendant, α. One can see that with symmetric stakes (α = 1), the observed
win rate is biased towards 50% relative to the population win rate. As asymmetry increases (α < 1),
the litigation rate increases and the observed win rate actually rises above the population win rate,
i.e., the 50% bias is reversed.3
Generalizing PK, we develop a model of litigation in which we account for the opportunity cost
of litigation. The model explicitly allows for (1) multiple parties (leading to asymmetric stakes),
(2) binding precedent, and (3) pre-dispute bargaining done in the “shadow” of precedent. The
pre-dispute bargaining creates an endogenous opportunity cost of litigation for both plaintiff and
defendant.4 Including the opportunity cost of litigation enables us to examine both the up side
and down side of asymmetry. We examine both the win rate and the litigation rate in the face
of endogenous opportunity costs, and find striking contrasts with PK’s results. The most striking
result is that asymmetric stakes do not generally alter the litigation condition relative to the sym-
metric stakes case. This result is important for the empirical literature relying on the asymmetric
stakes interpretation of PK. We show that this result, previously presumed in much of the empirical
literature, is a special case.
1Technically, Che and Yi do not model precedent per se ; rather, they assume that cases are correlated. Parties
become more informed about the legal standard for correlated cases when the court rules on the first case.
2PK themselves point out the limitation of the assumption of a simple J payoff. To demonstrate the basic principle
of selection and its effects on win rates, this assumption is innocuous.
3The figure assumes that the total legal costs of the two parties is equal to 1
3
J, and that the standard deviations
of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s errors are 0.3 (see section 2 for more detail).
4 In a broader sense the endogenous opportunity cost endogenizes the harm that will arise from any future dispute.
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The next section develops the basic structure of the model in the context of patent litigation.
We introduce the concept of a pre-dispute royalty rate, which represents the opportunity cost of
litigation. Section 3 extends the model to include multiple defendants (from which we derive the
asymmetry from precedent). The pre-dispute equilibrium r is the result of implicit bargaining be-
tween the patent holder and all potential licensees. We derive the litigation condition and compare
the results to those of PK. Section 5 discusses the implications of the model, and applies the analysis
to legal setting where parties can bargain (or, otherwise take measures to reduce exposure to liti-
gation) prior to the dispute. We argue that endogenous opportunity costs and asymmetry are the
general case, of which PK represents a special case.
Pre-dispute bargaining creates endogenous harm by the licensees/infringers, in that infringement
on a higher r will lead to greater lost profits to the plaintiff than infringement on a lower r. The
bargaining can be implicit or explicit, in the sense that rational infringing parties will recognize the
lost opportunity to license at the going royalty rate when they infringe. In the model, infringers
presume that the royalty rate would be negotiated in the shadow of threats about litigation, the
consequences of precedent, and beliefs about validity. The model has applications beyond patent
law, to any area of law where potential defendents are subject to precedent, and where harm can be
mitigated through investment in precaution.
2 Model
The model is motivated by intellectual property litigation. We use patent litigation as an example
because it concretely applies the notions of pre-dispute bargaining (endogenous opportunity cost)
and asymmetry. The opportunity cost of litigation is in the form of a hypothetical license that each
party rejects in favor of litigation. The asymmetry of stakes in the model relates to patent validity.
If a patent holder determines to prosecute an infringement claim, it risks invalidation of the patent.
Invalidation means a lost opportunity to receive royalty income from other licensees, or damages
from other infringers. On the other hand, a valid patent means greater bargaining power licensees
and infringers alike. In this way the asymmetry has both an up side and a down side. Bargaining
over the hypothetical license proceeds strategically.
Following PK, let Y ′˜N(0, 1) be a random variable representing the facts of individual cases. y′
is an individual draw of Y ′. In the patent context, the draw of y′ represent the facts surrounding
the validity of a patent.
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Additionally, Y ∗ represents the decision standard. If y′ > Y ∗ then the patent “quality” ex-
ceeds the patentability bar, and the patent is valid. However, both the patent holder and potential
infringers/licensees measure y′ with error. In particular, YˆA = Y ′+εA is a random variable represent-
ing the patent holder’s guess regarding patent quality, where εA is distributed N(0, σA). Similarly,
YˆB = Y
′ + εB is the potential infringer’s estimate of patent quality. Where εA and εB are dis-
tributed with density functions fA and fB, and with cumulative distribution functions FA and FB,
respectively.
Given draws !yA and !yB we can define A’s and B’s beliefs about patent validity as
pA = Pr(Y
′ > Y ∗|!yA) = FA(!yA − Y ∗) (1)
pB = Pr(Y
′ > Y ∗|!yB) = FB(!yB − Y ∗). (2)
Again, following PK, we consider a dispute between parties A and B, regarding A’s patent. The
value of the patent to B is given by v. If B is to use the technology, the parties may elect to bargain
over a licensing contract at royalty r, where r ∈ [0, 1] indicating a proportion of the total value of
the innovation to B. The total royalty payment is rv. If they forgo licensing, then they litigate. In
litigation, each pays litigation costs. If y′ > Y ∗ then the court rules the patent valid, and the patent
holder receives v from B. If y′ < Y ∗, then A loses the patent right, and the patent lapses into the
public domain (in which case B may infringe the technology with impunity). If the parties license,
their payoffs are
πA = rv (3)
πB = (1− r)v (4)
The expected gross payoff that each party believes it will receive from litigation are given by
πA = pAv − cA (5)
πB = (1− pB)v − cB, (6)
where cA and cB are the litigation costs for each party.5 These expected payoffs mirror those used
by PK. However, when each party litigates, it gives up the opportunity to license at some royalty
r, expressed as a proportion of the value v paid by B to A. For an arbitrary r, A’s net benefit of
litigation (or the “ask” price to settle the dispute) can be written as
a = pAv − cA − rv, (7)
5For parsimony, we assume that settlement costs are zero; or, alternatively, that c represents the difference between
litigation costs and settlement costs. The qualitative results are robust to this assumption.
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where r represents the opportunity cost of giving up the opportunity to license. This is the minimum
payment that A will accept to forgo litigation. Similarly, B’s bid to settle reflects the cost of giving
up the opportunity to license,
b = pBv + cB − rv. (8)
The value of b reflects the maximum amount that B is willing to pay to forgo litigation (it obtains
(1− r)v from settling, and loses (1− pB)v − cB by going to court).
These bid and ask prices reflect those of PK except for the opportunity cost rv.
A sufficient condition for litigation to occur is if a > b,6 or
pAv − cA − rv > pBv + cB − rv (9)
pA − pB > cA + cB
v
. (10)
The condition is equivalent to saying that there is no cooperative surplus to settlement, where
cooperative surplus is given by b− a.
In the case of symmetric stakes, the opportunity cost r drops out of the litigation condition,
and the condition reduces to the standard PK result. However, when there are multiple potential
infringers/licensees, the patent holder is faced with asymmetry of stakes.
3 Asymmetric stakes
We consider asymmetry only on the part of the patent holder, A. That is, we consider a patent holder
facing N potential licensees/litigants. The asymmetry arises in this case because of precedent. If
the patent holder tries one case against a single infringer, then we assume that the ruling on validity
will be binding on all future cases involving the same technology. So, once a patent is validated,
the precedent is binding and validity is known with certainty and can be enforced costlessly. If
a patent is invalidated, then the patent lapses into the public domain and all licensees/infringers
may use the technology without fear of reprisal. Assuming that proven validity affects bargaining
power, then the precedent will enable the patent holder to begin “knocking on the doors” of other
licensees/infringers in order to secure a higher royalty.
Formally, we assume N licensees/infringers indexed by B1...BN . The technological value of the
patent remains v. We can think of licensee i as having a market share αi, so that the private value
6 It is possible for bargaining to break down even if a < b. However, if there is no cooperative surplus, then it will
be impossible for the parties to bargain to a mutually agreeable settlement. Thus, the litigation condition given here
is sufficient.
5
of the patent to licensee i is αiv, and
N"
i=1
αi = 1. That is, v is the total fixed technological value
of the patent distributed according to the market shares of the producers in the market.7 In any
particular negotiation between A and Bi, αi represents the degree of asymmetry. This is because
the court’s decision about validity applies to the patent as a whole, not only the αi portion used by
Bi. Thus, the patent holder has greater stakes than the licensee/infringer.8
In bargaining, each pair A and Bi will consider a royalty rate ri against which they will consider
the litigation decision. As in the single licensee case, ri is a royalty rate relative to the patent value
v. So, the total royalty payment between A and Bi is αiriv, which reflects the opportunity cost of
litigating. To complete the notation, let cA be the litigation cost of the patent holder, as above, and
let ci be the litigation cost for licensee i. For notational simplicity let
a =

α1
α2
...
αN

, r =

r1
r2
...
rN

, c =

c1
c2
...
cN

.
3.1 Litigation
Assuming that litigation (if it occurs) occurs only between A and Bi,9 the payoffs to A and Bi from
licensing are
πAlicense = r
′av (11)
πBlicense = (1− ri)αiv (12)
where r′av is the sum of the patentholder’s royalty payments from all parties. Note that licensing
assumes that all licensees agree on their respective royalty rates. The expected gross payoffs the
7The assumption that v and N are fixed may not appropriate for certain kinds of market structures, e.g., free
entry Cournot with homogeneous products. However, in the case of a differentiated products market, the assumption
is more reasonable. In any case it does not drive the results.
8Priest and Klein allow for the asymmetry to favor the plaintiff or defendent. In their parlance, the share of the
judgment J that is paid by the defendent to the plaintiff is αJ. Note that α can be greater than one, indicating that
the plaintiff receives less than the defendent pays. This might arise in the case of a large defendent facing many
possible plaintiffs, e.g., products liability. As discussed in Waldfogel (1995), the asymmetry in the case of patents is
likely to favor the patent holder.
In the present case, the fact that asymmetry can only go in one direction does not systematically alter the results,
as we show below.
9 I show below that this assumption holds in equilibrium.
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parties believe they will receive from litigation are given by
πAlitigate = pAv − cA (13)
πBlitigate = (1− pB)v − cB . (14)
Again, litigation involves an opportunity cost. The patent holder risks invalidating the patent in
court. In the case of multiple licensees, the invalidation applies to all parties. So, a valid patent
will set a precedent that holds for all future cases, and all licenses will be updated to a royalty rate
of ri = 1 for all i, and r′av = v. However, and invalid patent implies that the royalty rate will be
updated to ri = 0 for all i, and r′av = 0. Thus, A’s net benefit of litigation (or the “ask” price to
settle the dispute) can be written as
a(r) = pAv − cA − r′av (15)
= pAv − cA − riαiv − qi(r)v (16)
where
qi(r) = r
′a− riαi. (17)
Similarly, Bi’s bid price is given by
bi(ri) = piαiv + ci − riαiv. (18)
where pi represents Bi’s estimate that the patent is valid.
Litigation will occur if the cooperative surplus is negative, or equivalently if
a(r) > bi(ri) (19)
pAv − cA − riαiv − qi(r)v > piαiv + ci − riαiv (20)
pA − αipi > qi(r)+cA + ci
v
. (21)
This condition is similar to the PK asymmetric stakes result with the exception of the qi(r) term.
Treating qi(r) as exogenous means that litigation will become less likely than in the PK setting.
However, it is difficult to believe that r is independent of the beliefs of the parties about validity.
We turn in the next section to endogenizing r. Prior to that, we elaborate on the litigation condition.
PK use condition 10 to describe a sufficient condition for litigation. Because allow only for the
cases of litigation and settlement, this condition suffices. However, if the parties can bargain on ri
prior to litigation, then a further condition must hold in order for there to be a legitimate dispute.
In particular, it must be that
a(r) ≥ 0 ≥ bi(ri) (22)
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in order for litigation to occur. That is, both parties must prefer litigation to accepting the proposed
license agreement in order for litigation to be a rational outcome of the bargaining process. For
instance, if a(r) < 0 and bi(ri) < 0, but a(r) > bi(ri) then we can hardly imagine that litigation will
occur. In this case, there is a cooperative surplus to litigation, but only one party (Bi) wants to
litigate. This case does not apply to PK because the status quo is assumed to be zero; the parties
do not give up the license in order to litigate. Rather, PK assume that the “harm” has occurred
and that it is exogenous to the litigation/settlement decision.
In the present model, pre-trial bargaining on the royalty rate is assumed to depend upon the
likelihood of going to court and on the beliefs about the parties (or the other model parameters).
So, if a(r) < 0, one has to wonder whether the initial bargaining on r was efficient. Below, we solve
for the renegotiation-proof r∗ and show that condition 21 implies 22.
3.2 Settlement and Renegotiation
3.2.1 Settlement
The patent holder and licensee i settle if
a(r) ≤ bi(ri) (23)
and
a(r) ≤ 0 ≤ bi(ri) (24)
When these conditions hold, cooperative surplus exists, where the cooperative surplus is given by
bi(ri) − a(r). In this instance both parties prefer the status quo–the existing royalty scheme–to
litigation. No further negotiation or money exchange is required since the initial conditions in effect
already divide the cooperative surplus.
Thus, in our model settlement is equivalent to there being no dispute to begin with. A dispute
arises if no r can be found that is agreeable to all parties.
This departs from PK because they assume an exogenous harm, and a dispute is created from
that harm. In the patent context if the parties can agree on r, then no harm occurs (no infringement).
This does not imply that in all cases no dispute will arise at all. However, we assume that if a dispute
arises, that settlement costs are small relative to litigation costs, and that the parties will eventually
arrive at an r that would have precluded a dispute to begin with. The next section discusses this
bargaining.
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3.2.2 Renegotiation
When
a(r) ≤ bi(ri) (25)
then cooperative surplus exists, and the parties will be able to bargain to a settlement. But, if
bi(ri) < 0 or a(r) > 0 (26)
then one party prefers litigation to the status quo. The existing royalty scheme would lead to
litigation if the parties were not able to negotiate over the cooperative surplus, because one party
would initiate a suit. PK’s model (and ours) assumes that if litigation can be avoided then it will
be, if settlement costs are low enough (we normalize settlement costs to zero). Conversely, having
no cooperative surplus is a sufficient condition for litigation.
To avoid litigation one party must make a side payment to the other to not go to trial. As
long as a cooperative surplus exists, then some side payment will be possible. The parties split the
surplus by negotiating a new royalty. We assume that renegotiation occurs according to the Nash
bargaining solution.10 In particular, we allow the patent holder to have bargaining power relative
to Bi based on the size of αi. The cooperative surplus of bi(ri)−a(r) will be divided between A and
Bi according to the shares 11+αi and
αi
1+αi
, respectively.
When A and Bi renegotiate, the gross payoffs are given by the payoff from litigation plus the
share of cooperative surplus. So, after renegotiation the new ask and bid will be
a′(r) = a(r) +
1
1 + αi
(bi(ri)− a(r)) (27)
b′i(r) = bi(ri) +
αi
1 + αi
(bi(ri)− a(r)) . (28)
After renegotiation, a′ and b′i will lead to settlement whenever a(r) ≤ bi(ri). Renegotiation will
always cause a′ < 0 and b′i > 0 whenever a < bi, indicating that neither party wishes to litigate (see
proposition 4 and corollary 6).
The gross payoffs after renegotiation will be
πArenegotiate = pAv − cA +
1
1 + αi
(bi(ri)− a(r)) (29)
πirenegotiate = (1− pi)αiv − ci +
αi
1 + αi
(bi(ri)− a(r)) (30)
10Daughety and Reinganum (1993) discuss the timing of litigation models. Like PK we ignore the sequencing of
the bargaining game, and rely on the Nash bargaining solution as a simplification. Daughety and Reinganum find
that some situations with asymmetric information lead to offers made for the purposes of signalling and screening.
However, sequencing of offers never occurs when the timing of offers is endogenous.
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Note that the renegotiated royalty rates will depend upon the royalties being paid by all other
licensees/infringers because A’s opportunity cost is implicitly a function of the average royalty r′a.
3.3 The renegotiation-proof license
When the patent holder and a defendant renegotiate to avoid litigation, the gross payoffs imply
an implicit royalty that would have avoided the dispute altogether had it been the original royalty.
Since we assume that the parameters of the model are known prior to bargaining, rational parties
will negotiate to this royalty in the first instance.
In the case of a single dispute, the gross payoffs to the parties can be written as a function of a
new implicit royalty rate. Let )ri indicate the implicit renegotiated royalty rate. Then,
πArenegotiate = pAv − cA +
1
1 + αi
(bi(ri)− a(r)) = qi(r)v + )riαiv (31)
πirenegotiate = (1− pi)αiv − ci +
αi
1 + αi
(bi(ri)− a(r)) = (1− )ri)αiv. (32)
A’s payoff is simply the sum of all the other royalty payments plus the renegotiated payment
from Bi. Bi’s payoff is simply its value αiv of the innovation less its renegotiated royalty payment
of )riαiv.
Solving equation 31 for )ri one can show that
qi(r)v + )riαiv = pAv − cA + 1
1 + αi
(bi(ri)− a(r)) (33)
)ri = 1
1 + αi
*
2pi +
ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r)
+
(34)
where pi =
pA+pi
2 (see appendix B.1 for the derivation). The same implicit license obtains from
solving equation 32. Because )ri does not depend on ri, strategic or myopic pre-trial bargaining is
corrected by renegotiation. In other words, any initial ri will be renegotiated to )ri if renegotiation
occurs.11
The royalty rate from renegotiation makes intuitive sense. The term qi(r) represents the weighted
average of all other negotiated royalties (for the moment those are assumed to be fixed). If this term
is large, then the patent holder has a large opportunity cost of bringing suit against a particular
licensee. Thus, Bi has more power to lower its payment ri when others are willing to pay more (for
this reason, we make qi endogenous in the next section). Additionally, higher initial beliefs about
11Daughety and Reinganum (2004) point out that if bargaining occurs sequentially with multiple bargaining part-
ners, then “most favored nation” clauses can be used strategically, and that this will affect the equilibrium contract
price. In order to stay close to PK, we assume that bargaining with all licensees takes place simultaneously.
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validity will raise the license fee, which is intuitive. Litigation costs can work in either direction; if
ci is large relative to cA and v, then the payment to the patent holder will be higher (Bi’s threat
of going to court is less credible). Lastly, as αi increases, it is presumed that its bargaining power
increases, so )ri decreases.
Definition 1 A royalty rate rsi is renegotiation-proof if, for any original ri and bargaining rule,
the implicit royalty resulting from renegotiation, )ri, is equal to the renegotiation proof royalty, i.e.,
)ri = rsi .
The renegotiation-proof royalty ensures that the parties bargain optimally in the first instance,
so that myopic and strategic bargaining are excluded. Strategic bargaining is excluded in the sense
that an artificially high or low ri cannot lead to a better outcome by forcing renegotiation, because
the parties split the surplus at the time of the renegotiation.
Let ri be defined as
ri = pi +
ci/αi − cA
2v
. (35)
ri represents a central tendency of the renegotiated royalty (as we show below). Equivalently, it
is the renegotiated royalty if αi = 1 (so that there are no other licensees/infringers). With this
definition, we can rewrite the renegotiation-proof license as
)ri = 1
1 + αi
*
2pi +
ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r)
+
(36)
)ri = 2ri
1 + αi
− qi(r)
1 + αi
(37)
This expression can be further simplified to be an implicit function of ri and the average royalty.
)ri (1 + αi) = 2r¯i − qi(r) (38)
)ri = 2ri − a′r = ri + (ri − a′r) (39)
The final expression for )ri provides another useful interpretation; the renegotiated royalty always
approaches ri. The final royalty is ri plus an adjustment that reflects how far ri is from the weighted
average of all licenses. If ri tends to be large relative to the average license, then )ri > ri > a′r. The
larger is αi, the more compressed the resulting differences will be.
3.4 Properties of the renegotiation-proof license
Equation 34 gives the renegotiation-proof royalty rate for a given set of “outside licenses,” where
outside refers to all licensees aside from i. Assuming these are fixed, we can show that the royalty
rate has some attractive features. First, the renegotiation-proof royalty is unique.
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Proposition 2 For any bargaining rule and set of "outside” licenses q, there is a unique renegotiation-
proof )ri.
Proof. For any positive range of cooperative surplus, there is a continuum of licenses that would
lead to settlement. However, by definition, the particular bargaining rule will identify only one
royalty from that continuum. Additionally, see appendix B.2.
Proposition 2 holds for a particular bargaining rule only. That is, each bargaining rule will yield
a different renegotiation-proof royalty. Additionally, there may be other royalty rates that divide
the surplus to settlement. However, for a particular bargaining rule, only )ri will divide the surplus
for an arbitrarily small cooperative surplus.
Definition 3 Consistent litigation preferences exist when both parties prefer to litigate or both par-
ties prefer the status quo.
Proposition 4 The renegotiation-proof license will lead to litigation if and only if both parties prefer
litigation, i.e., it makes litigation preferences consistent.
Proof. See appendix B.3.
Hence, anytime there is a cooperative surplus, )ri avoids litigation without renegotiation. Con-
versely, whenever there is no cooperative surplus, )ri ensures that both parties prefer to litigate. In
this way we can say that )ri makes litigation preferences “consistent.” Considering the alternative,
there are values for ri that would lead one party to want to litigate and one party to want to settle.
This situation is excluded in PK because the status quo is normalized to zero (since the parties may
only choose between litigation and settlement). Their assumption holds when harm is exogenous,
such as in some personal injury claims; however, even in these cases parties can generally choose
precaution levels pre-harm.
In many instances, such as in patent cases (aside from unintentional infringement), the parties
could have bargained prior to harm occurring. ri indicates a hypothetical royalty rate that is
proposed. The licensee/infringer decides whether to infringe and litigate or to accept the license.
Should the patent holder intentionally choose a very high royalty, it will be inviting infringement. It
is irrational to do so if there is a lower royalty that would be mutually agreeable. In that sense, the
harm (infringement) is endogenous to the choice or royalty rate. In the model, an excessively high
ri would lead to renegotiation if there is a cooperative surplus. If there is not a cooperative surplus,
then the proposed royalty rate is irrelevant to the final payoffs.
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Similarly, an excessively low royalty is equally irrational. The licensee/infringer would accept
the royalty only to have the patent holder renege and file suit. Again, renegotiation would yield an
)ri which makes litigation preferences consistent, so that the parties agree to the license or agree to
litigate.
The process of renegotiation is illustrated in figure 2, in the context of symmetric stakes.12 In
both panels, we graph the dollar value of the patent-holder’s ask price and the license’s bid price
against different values of the royalty rate. Panel A reflects the situation where there is positive
cooperative surplus to settling, and panel B reflects the litigation case. In both panels, royalty rates
less than x will cause the patent holder to prefer litigation (its ask price will be positive). Similarly,
high royalty rates (greater than y) will cause the licensee to prefer litigation. The renegotiation
proof royalty is represented by z, which is always between x and y.
When there is no cooperative surplus (panel A) we should observe settlement. However, for very
high levels of the royalty rate (above y in the figure) the licensee will prefer to litigate than to pay
the royalty; i.e., B’s bid is less than zero. Since A does not wish to litigate, it can attempt to split
the cooperative surplus with B and move the royalty back into the settlement range. A similar
situation happens when the royalty is very low (below x). In that case A prefers to litigate, and B
will need to bribe A with some of the surplus in order to avoid litigation. Note that the cooperative
surplus is positive for the entire range of royalty rates, but that litigation preferences of the two
parties change.
In panel B of figure 2, we see the case where there is no cooperative surplus to settling. Here,
values for the royalty below y will lead to a situation where A wants to litigate, but B does not.
Similarly, royalties above x will make only B want to litigate. Renegotiation to z = )r will cause
both parties to want to litigate. Proposition 8 shows that the parties can not be made better off by
considering inefficiently high or low royalties.
In the asymmetric stakes case, an inefficiently high royalty can cause the cooperative surplus
to be positive even when it is negative at )ri.13 That is, it can appear that the parties can avoid
litigation by choosing an arbitrarily high r. Proposition 8 demonstrates that this strategy can not
make the parties better off than litigation.
Definition 5 A party has efficient litigation preferences when it prefers to litigate if and only if
there is no cooperative surplus.
12The intuition holds for the asymmetric case.
13Note that the Ask and Bid lines are not parallel in the asymmetric stakes case.
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Corollary 6 The renegotiation-proof license will lead to litigation if and only if there is no cooper-
ative surplus, i.e., it makes litigation preferences efficient.
Corollary 6 follows from the fact that the renegotiation-proof license always splits the cooperative
surplus (whether positive or negative). Because of this, both parties will always agree on litigation,
and it will only occur if the cooperative surplus to bargaining is negative.
Corollary 7 The renegotiation-proof license uniquely satisfies proposition 4 and corollary 6.
As the cooperative surplus shrinks to a single point, the renegotiation-proof license is the only
one that will avoid litigation, because it always splits the surplus. This is shown in the appendix
B.2.
Proposition 8 The renegotiation-proof license is Pareto efficient.
Proof. See appendix B.4
This proposition is crucial since it eliminates the possibility of choosing an “irrational” royalty
in order to commit the parties to a better equilibrium. If the parties prefer litigation with )ri, then
litigation is efficient.14
3.5 Nash equilibrium licenses
The equilibrium r∗ is a vector of royalty rates such that all parties bargain to a renegotiation proof
license. Because )ri depends upon all the other licenses (in the qi(r) term), the equilibrium is a
solution to a linear system of equations. Formally, let
r∗ =

r∗1
r∗2
...
r∗N

and r =
r¯1
r¯2
...
r¯N
where r∗ is a vector of renegotiation-proof royalty rates, and ri is defined according to equation 35:
ri = pi +
ci/αi − cA
2v
. (40)
From equation 39 the renegotiation-proof renegotiation proof royalty rate is implicitly defined as
)ri = 2ri − a′r. (41)
14Note that litigation is efficient only from the perspective of the parties involved and their divergent beliefs about
the trial outcome.
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Equilibrium occurs where each party negotiates to this royalty. The equilibrium is found by solving
for all fees simultaneously. In the case of the equilibrium royalty r∗ we can say that each individual
royalty must satisfy
r∗i = 2ri − a′r∗. (42)
Or, in matrix notation
r∗ = 2r¯− ia′r∗ (43)
where i is a column vector of ones.
Solving simultaneously,
r∗ + ia′r∗ = 2r¯ (44),
I+ ia′
-
r∗ = 2r¯ (45)
r∗ =
,
I+ ia′
-−1
2r¯ (46)
The inverse of
,
I+ ia′
-
is given by
,
I− 12 ia′
-
, so
r∗ =
*
I− 1
2
ia′
+
2r¯ (47)
r∗ = 2r¯− ia′r¯. (48)
For an individual license,
r∗i = 2ri − a′r. (49)
So, an individual license can be expressed as a function of the difference between ri and r.
Relating equation 49 with equation 42, one can see that a′r∗ = a′r¯ in equilibrium. This does
not, of course, imply that r∗ = r¯, only that the weighted averages are equal. The intuition follows
from the fact that )ri − ri = ri − a′r. For a given set of licenses r, if ri differs from the weighted
average of all licenses, then )ri is twice the distance from the weighted average. In equilibrium this is
true for all licenses, so the individual differences from a′r negate one another, and a′r∗ = a′r¯. This
value is, in fact, the patent holder’s equilibrium revenue.
This fact is useful because ri is dependent only on parameters identified with A and Bi. That
is, it does not depend on the value of the other license. So, while we may not know each individual
r∗i , we do know that the weighted average royalty facing A is equivalent to a
′r.
Also, it is important to note that the solution holds for any arbitrary vector of market shares a,
meaning that the equilibrium allows for heterogeneity of firms. Of course, as N rises, the average αi
must decrease. Nonetheless, the solution accounts for the distribution of shares–or the concentration
of licensees.
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4 Litigation in Equilibrium
Proposition 9 In equilibrium, all parties have consistent litigation preferences.
Proof. From expression 21, in equilibrium litigation occurs between defendant i and the plaintiff if
pA − αipi > qi (r∗) + cA + ci
v
. (50)
Substituting qi (r∗) = a′r∗ − αir∗i , the condition becomes
pA − αipi > (a′r∗ − αir∗i ) +
cA + ci
v
. (51)
Using the fact that a′r∗ = a′r and the definition of r∗i from equation 49,
pA − αipi > (a′r− αi(2r¯i − a′r)) + cA + ci
v
. (52)
Finally, using the definition of ri from equation 35,
pA − αipi > (1 + αi)a′r− αi2
*
pA + pi
2
+
ci/αi − cA
2v
+
+
cA + ci
v
(53)
pA(1 + αi) > (1 + αi)a
′r+ (1 + αi)
cA
v
(54)
The expression reduces to
pA − a′r > cA
v
(55)
This result is very important: litigation between A and any licensee depends on the average
license, in equilibrium. Thus, the condition is the same for all licensees faced by the patent holder.
If the patent holder wishes to litigate against one licensee, then it will be willing to litigate against
any licensee. The patent holder will, of course, only need to litigate against one licensee in order to
obtain a decision from the court. It is important to note that this result follows from the fact that
pre-dispute bargaining over the proposed license fee occurs in the shadow of the credible threats
made by the respective parties. And the size of that shadow depends heavily on the precedential
impact of the decision. Because the decision applies to all other related cases, the threat points
depend on the market-wide pre-dispute bargaining by all players.
The intuition for expression 55 is that it is the average royalty that matters. If if it is too low
relative to the patent holder’s beliefs pA, then the patent holder will want a decision from the court.
If it is high, then patent holder will be unwilling to litigate against any particular low )ri licensee,
because it risks losing the high average royalty if the patent is invalidated.
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By expanding a′r, we can write an expression for litigation that mimics that of PK.
We know that
a′r =
N.
i=1
αiri (56)
a′r =
N.
i=1
αi
pA + pi
2
+
N.
i=1
ci − αicA
2v
(57)
a′r =
pA + a
′p
2
+
i′c−cA
2v
(58)
where a′p is the weighted average of the licensees’ beliefs and i′c is the sum of all the licensees’
litigation costs.
In equilibrium, if there is litigation we have shown above that the choice of defendant is irrelevant,
since all parties have consistent litigation preferences. Thus ci may be replaced by αici if Bi expects
that it will bear the cost of litigation with probability αi (e.g., a defendant is chosen at random
based on market share). In that case equation 58 becomes
a′r =
pA + a
′p
2
+
a′c−cA
2v
(59)
and the litigation condition can be written as
pA − a′p > cA + a
′c
v
(60)
which is virtually identical to PK’s result for symmetric stakes, with the exception that pB is replaced
by a′p and cB is replaced by a′c.
This result is important because the asymmetry of stakes does not affect the probability of
litigation. That is, asymmetry does not substantially change the litigation rate–and consequently
the observed win rate–relative to symmetric stakes. Showing that asymmetry is inconsequential
would be, admittedly, a mundane result, were it not in contrast to the presumption of most of the
literature on litigation selection and stakes.
While asymmetry does not directly impact the litigation condition, it does have an indirect
impact. Asymmetry matters to the extent that the weighted average a′p will have a lower variance
that pi, if licensees’ draws of the facts of the case are independently distributed. In the PK model,
lower variance leads to less litigation. Thus, relative to the symmetric stakes case, and assuming that
each pi is calculated on the basis of draws from the same distribution for all i ∈ N , then asymmetry
will lead to less litigation.
Relative to the original model posed by PK, this model specifies both an upside and a downside
to asymmetry in allowing an opportunity cost of litigation. PK assume that there is only an upside
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and that the downside is the status quo of zero. However, in practice, this is a special case and not
likely to be true in the case of precedent.
The result of the model in terms of the litigation condition is quite intuitive: because the oppor-
tunity cost of litigation is endogenous, the upside and downside from asymmetry work in opposite
directions and drive prices, and the litigation condition to the original PK result.
5 Discussion
The model presented in this paper brings the PK model “full circle” to allow for bargaining prior to
harm. This pre-dispute bargaining creates an endogenous opportunity cost. The strategic bargaining
by the parties in the shadow of precedent creates an equilibrium where the amount of harm caused
by a failure to reach an agreement is endogenous. Because αi drops out of the litigation condition,
its only impact is from the distribution of beliefs and legal costs as they relate to α. There are two
important implications: endogenous harm and selection effects.
Pre-dispute bargaining creates endogenous harm by the licensees/infringers, in that infringement
on a higher r will lead to greater lost profits to the plaintiff than infringement on a lower r. The
bargaining can be implicit or explicit, in the sense that rational infringing parties will recognize the
lost opportunity to license at the going royalty rate when they infringe. In the model presented
here, infringers presume that the royalty rate would be negotiated in the shadow of threats about
litigation, the consequences of precedent, and beliefs about validity. Similarly, the patent holder
recognizes that litigating against a small infringer will risk the royalty rates available from potential
licensees who esteem the patent more highly.
The application is more broad than bargaining over a royalty: the ability to mitigate harm prior
to a dispute goes well beyond the narrow application of patent infringement. In the context of torts,
bargaining for a royalty rate equates to investment in precaution levels where precaution is bilateral.
If harm can be mitigated by investment in precaution, then subsequent disputes, litigation, and
court decisions will be subject to the incentives of parties to take precaution in the shadow of the
law.
We also found that asymmetry does not directly impact the litigation rate (and hence the win
rate). However, it does have consequences on bargaining. Consider a small infringer and a big
infringer with shares α < 12 and 1− α > 12 , respectively. In equilibrium, the bargaining represented
by the large licensee’s royalty gives the small firm more bargaining power: for a given set of beliefs
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it can bargain to a relatively low royalty rate because the patent holder is required to count the full
cost of litigation. If it is content with the royalty from the large firm, the small firm can extract
more surplus with a lower rate. However, if litigation costs are high, then the small firm’s bargaining
power is limited unless litigation costs are related to α.15 If expected litigation costs are proportional
to α, then in equilibrium the patent holder is indifferent to diffuse usage or concentrated usage, with
the exception that diffuse ownership is less “risky,” in terms of the distribution of pi. If expected
litigation costs are not proportional to α, then the patent holder can extract higher a′r∗.
Bargaining in the shadow of precedent impacts the interpretation of the reasonable royalty es-
timation of damages in patent litigation. What is the “reasonable royalty” to award if the patent
holder prevails? Courts have determined that reasonable royalties be “based upon a hypothetical
negotiation between the patent owner and the infringer,. . . with both parties to the negotiation as-
suming that the patent is valid and would be infringed but for the license” (Northlake v. Glaverbel,
72 F. Supp. 2d 893 [1999]). This decision explicitly acknowledges that prior bargaining over r is
done in the shadow of precedent. Scholars have also suggested that, in the language of the model,
the royalty will update to r = 1 (Sherry and Teece 2004).
With regard to the litigation rate, we find that even with asymmetric stakes litigation is essentially
the same as in the original PK model. The important implication of this is on the selection effects
of litigation. Because in equilibrium the litigation rate is essentially unchanged, then the observed
win rate will be essentially unchanged relative to the PK model. So, we would not expect to see the
win rate biased away from 50%, even in highly asymmetric situations. The empirical literature is
mixed on this point. Waldfogel (1995) finds that win rates in patent cases are biased away from 50%,
whereas Marco (2004) finds that the win rates of litigated cases are biased towards 50% relative to
the population win rate. Additionally, if litigation preferences are consistent, then litigation could
be modeled in a reduced form approach as a unilateral decision. Marco (2005) finds some evidence
of this.
A few caveats should be mentioned with regard to the model. First, we have assumed that
there is no signaling. Our model is one of divergent beliefs only, in order to remain close to the PK
model. However, some scholars have found asymmetric information and signaling to be important
(Meurer 1989, Choi 1998). However, as mentioned above, Daughety and Reinganum (1993) find that
when the timing of the bargaining is endogenous, signalling does not occur. Alternatively, one could
15One way to have expected litigation costs proportional to α is to assume that in litigation in equilibrium each
party expects to be sued with a probability proportional to its market share, as in expression 60.
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assume that the beliefs the parties have about patent validity include the information contained
about all other parties’ beliefs.
Additionally, in equilibrium there is no observed infringement in our model: there is only licensing
or immediate litigation and trial. One could relax the assumption of immediate litigation by including
an enforcement cost or enforcement error, so that we could observe infringement “under the radar.”
While this would highlight some features of accommodated infringement, the results on asymmetric
stakes are unlikely to change substantially.
Lastly, in extreme cases of very low αi and very high ci, it is possible for r∗i > 1 without litigation.
It is never the case that a′r∗ > 1. If r∗i > 1, it means that the licensee is receiving a negative net
profit because πi = αiv − αirv < 0. This situation occurs because we implicitly assume that the
licensees are committed to using the technology (whether by licensing or litigating). That is, we
have advanced PK by one step by allowing for pre-dispute bargaining. However, we have not gone
the further step to allow for users to opt out of the technology altogether. This extension could
take two forms: (1) allow users to opt out whenever r > 1, and to take a payoff of zero; or, (2)
endogenize αi. Either extension would bring more realism to the model. However, the purpose in
this paper is to compare the original PK model to a model of asymmetric stakes is the opportunity
cost of litigation is endogenous. Taking further extensions are worthwhile, but would obscure the
result here.
A last remark is that it is certainly possible that precedent set in one case could impact the
bargaining by parties unrelated to the original litigants. An interesting research agenda would be to
investigate the extent to which precedent is a public good, and to what extent individual litigants
will pursue litigation when they do not experience the benefit (or cost) of that precedent.
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A Figures
Figure 1: Priest and Klein simulation results
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Figure 2: Renegotiation and litigation preferences
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B Derivations
B.1 Solving for the implicit royalty
Solving equation 31 for )ri one can show that
qi(r)v + )riαiv = pAv − cA + 1
1 + αi
(bi(ri)− a(r))
= pAv − cA + 1
1 + αi
((piαiv + ci − riαiv)− (pAv − cA − riαiv − qi(r)v))
= pAv − cA + 1
1 + αi
(piαiv + ci − pAv + cA + qi(r)v)
)riαiv = pAv − cA + 1
1 + αi
(piαiv + ci − pAv + cA + qi(r)v)− qi(r)v
= (pAv − cA) αi
1 + αi
+
1
1 + αi
(piαiv + ci + qi(r)v)− qi(r)v
= (pAv − cA) αi
1 + αi
+
1
1 + αi
(piαiv + ci) +
1
1 + αi
qi(r)v − qi(r)v
)ri = /pA − cA
v
0 1
1 + αi
+
1
1 + αi
*
pi +
ci
αiv
+
+
qi(r)/αi
1 + αi
− qi(r)
αi
=
/
pA − cA
v
0 1
1 + αi
+
1
1 + αi
*
pi +
ci
αiv
+
+
qi(r)
αi (1 + αi)
− (1 + αi) qi(r)
(1 + αi)αi
=
/
pA − cA
v
0 1
1 + αi
+
1
1 + αi
*
pi +
ci
αiv
+
− qi(r)
(1 + αi)
=
1
1 + αi
*
pA + pi +
ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r)
+
=
1
1 + αi
*
2pi +
ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r)
+
B.2 Proof of proposition 2: Uniqueness
Proposition 2 For any bargaining rule and set of "outside” licenses q, there is a unique renegotiation-
proof )ri.
Proof. Given other factors, any royalty that satisfies
pA
αi
− qi(r)
αi
− cA
αiv
≤ )ri ≤ pi + ci
αiv
will avoid litigation. Though when
pA
αi
− qi(r)
αi
− cA
αiv
= pi +
ci
αiv
the only royalty that ensures
pA
αi
− qi(r)
αi
− cA
αiv
≤ )ri ≤ pi + ci
αiv
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is the unique royalty
pA
αi
− qi(r)
αi
− cA
αiv
= )ri = pi + ci
αiv
and since )ri always satisfies the condition, we see that )ri is the only royalty that always avoids
litigation when cooperative surplus exists.
B.3 Proof of proposition 4: Consistent litigation preferences
Proposition 4 The renegotiation-proof license will lead to litigation if and only if both parties prefer
litigation, i.e., it makes litigation preferences consistent.
Proof. Neither party will wish to litigate if
a(ri, r−i) ≤ 0 ≤ bi(ri, r−i). (61)
Royalties that satisfy this condition will allow parties to avoid litigation when litigation avoidance
is possible. Conversely, when parties choose to litigate, no renegotiation will avoid litigation. The
cooperative surplus is–after all–invariant to ri in a dispute between Bi and A.
It suffices to show that if bi > a, then bi()ri) ≥ 0 and a()ri) ≤ 0. A royalty between Bi and A will
avoid litigation without renegotiation if
a(ri, r−i) ≤ 0 ≤ bi(ri, r−i)
pAv − αiriv − qi(r)v − cA ≤ 0 ≤ piαiv − αiriv + ci
pAv − qi(r)v − cA ≤ αiriv ≤ piαiv + ci
pA − qi(r)− cA
v
≤ αiri ≤ piαi + ci
v
pA
αi
− qi(r)
αi
− cA
αiv
≤ ri ≤ pi + ci
αiv
(62)
Any royalty within the range defined by inequality 62 will avoid litigation when litigation is avoidable.
Equivalently, as long as there is cooperative surplus, any royalty within the range of inequality 62
will cause both parties to prefer the status quo to litigation.
We now show that
)ri ≤ pi + ci
αiv
⇐⇒ bi − a ≥ 0
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Substituting the definition of )ri from equation 34,
1
1 + αi
*
2pi +
ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r)
+
≤ pi + ci
αiv
pA + pi +
ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r) ≤ (1 + αi) pi + (1 + αi) ci
αiv
pA − αipi ≤ qi(r) + (1 + αi) ci
αiv
− ci/αi − cA
v
pA − αipi ≤ qi(r) + ci + cA
v
.
The last inequality is the converse of expression 21, which is equivalent bi − a ≥ 0.
We now show that
pA
αi
− qi(r)
αi
− cA
αiv
≤ )ri ⇐⇒ bi − a ≥ 0
Substituting the definition of )ri from equation 34,
pA
αi
− qi(r)
αi
− cA
αiv
≤ 1
1 + αi
*
2pi +
ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r)
+
(1 + αi)
pA
αi
− (1 + αi) qi(r)
αi
− (1 + αi) cA
αiv
≤ pA + pi + ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r)
(1 + αi)
pA
αi
− pA − pi ≤ ci/αi − cA
v
− qi(r) + (1 + αi) qi(r)
αi
+ (1 + αi)
cA
αiv
pA
αi
− pi ≤ ci/αi + cA/αi
v
+
qi(r)
αi
pA − αipi ≤ qi(r) + ci + cA
v
.
Again, the last inequality is the converse of expression 21, which is equivalent bi − a ≥ 0.
B.4 Proof of proposition 8: Pareto efficiency
Proposition 8 The renegotiation-proof license is Pareto efficient.
Proof. Cooperative Surplus Exists
Assume defendant i and the plaintiff initially face r∗i . Now assume that cooperative surplus
exists. Both the plaintiff and defendant prefer the existing situation to litigation, the conditions for
settlement are met. The gross payoff to the plaintiff is
πA = qi(r)v + αi)riv
and the gross payoff to the defendant is
πB = −αi)riv
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Now suppose that the plaintiff and defendant change the license fee to ri and that ri is in the
litigation-avoidance range. Gross Payoffs for the plaintiff and defendant become, respectively,
πA = qi(r)v + αiriv
πB = −αiriv
All else equal, this is clearly not a Pareto improvement. So when cooperative surplus exists, )ri is
Pareto efficient.
No Cooperative Surplus
Assume defendant i and the plaintiff initially face )ri. Now assume there is no cooperative surplus.
We know from before that when )ri leads to litigation, all other license fees will also foster litigation.
For any license fee, the respective plaintiff and defendant gross payoffs from litigation are
πA = A(r)+qi(r)v + αiriv = pAv − αiriv − qi(r)v − cA + qi(r)v + αiriv = pAv − cA
πB = −Bi(r)− αiriv = −piαiv + αiriv − ci − αiriv = −piαiv − ci
and these payoffs are invariant to the license fee between defendant i and the plaintiff. Hence when
there is no cooperative surplus, all else equal, )ri is still pareto efficient.
Regardless of whether )ri leads to litigation, no change in royalty is a pareto improvement.
26
References
C"#, Y.-K., )*+ J. G. Y. (1993): “The Role of Precedents in Repeated Litigation,” Journal of
Law, Economics, and Organization, 9(2), 399—424.
C"/., J. P. (1998): “Patent litigation as an informational-transmission mechanism,” American
Economic Review, 88(5), 1249—1263.
C//1#2, R. D., )*+ D. L. R67.*8#9+ (1989): “Economic analysis of legal disputes and their
resolution,” Journal of Economic Literature, 27, 1067—1097.
D)6:"#1;, A., )*+ J. R#.*:)*6= (2004): “Exploiting Future Settlements: A Signalling Model
of Most-Favored-Nation Clauses in Settlement Bargaining,” RAND Journal of Economics, 35(3),
467—85.
D)6:"#1;, A. F., )*+ J. F. R#.*:)*6= (1993): “Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement
and Litigation,” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 9(2), 314—48.
L)*?/6@, J. O., )*+ M. SD")*E#2=)* (2001): “Characteristics of Patent Litigation: A Window
on Competition,” RAND Journal of Economics, 32(1), 129—151.
M)2D/, A. C. (2004): “The Selection Effects (and Lack Thereof) in Patent Litigation: Evidence
from Trials,” Topics in Economics Analysis and Policy, 4(1).
(2005): “The Option Value of Patent Litigation: Theory and Evidence,” Review of Finan-
cial Economics, 14(3-4), 323—351.
M#62#2, M. J. (1989): “The settlement of patent litigation,” Rand Journal of Economics, 20(1),
77—91.
P2.#F1, G. L., )*+ B. K9#.* (1984): “The selection of disputes for litigation,” Journal of Legal
Studies, 13, 1—55.
S"#22;, E. F., )*+ D. J. T##D# (2004): “Royalties, Evolving Patent Rights, and the Value of
Innovation,” Research Policy, 33(2), 179—91.
W)9+8/:#9, J. (1995): “The selection hypothesis and the relationship between trial and plaintiff
victory,” Journal of Political Economy, 103(2), 229—260.
27
W.11=)*, D. (1988): “Dispute Resolution, Bargaining, and the Selection of Cases for Trial: A
Study of the Generation of Biased and Unbiased Data.,” Journal of Legal Studies, 17(2), 313—352.
28
